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Introduction 
Internet of Things (IoT), or as it is sometimes called, 
Internet of Everything (IoE), has made a technological 
revolution and is believed to be the next generation of 
backbone that connects all types of devices including 
sensors, actuators, GPS devices, mobiles, and almost 
every other thing [1]. IoT will consist of tens of billions 
of connected things that can generate, exchange and 
consume data along with humans. Since IoT is meant 
to serve in everyday human life scenarios, IoT systems 
have to be secure and, as far as possible, privacy 
preserving. However, it is difficult to provide security 
in heterogeneous networks. It should be taken into 
considerations that IoT devices are low power and 
resource-constrained. As such, some of the 
conventional unintelligent security provisioning 
techniques, which are often centralized, may not be 
appropriate and new smart and computationally 
lightweight solutions must be developed.  
In this paper, we focus on the authentication 
problem as well as key establishment between IoT 
nodes. We proposed a lightweight and intelligent 
authentication framework by taking into account the 
limited processing power of the end nodes. The 
proposed scheme is hierarchical in order to meet the 
heterogenous nature of IoT network and is scalable 
too. In the next section, we numerate IoT ecosystem 
security challenges and then, present our solution in 
the subsequent section. We discuss two scenarios for 
key establishment/authentication and show how we 
can intelligently reduce our reliance on central third 
parties to cope with the big scale of IoT network.  
IOT Security Challenges 
Some references suggest that IoT architecture 
should have three layers: Perception, Network and 
Application [1]–[3]. Perception layer contains sensors, 
actuators and other physical things, and due to its easy 
accessibility, is the most vulnerable layer. Since many 
edge devices have limited processing power, storage 
or memory capacities, they cannot do complex 
mathematical computations normally required in 
traditional security solutions. Therefore, lightweight 
solutions emerged to address this problem and satisfy 
the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) 
requirements in IoT platforms [4]-[6]. For example, 
some recent research works in the IoT security field 
focused on lightweight mutual authentication to save 
integrity of sensors’ data in smart cities [7]. Others 
tried increasing the protection level and focused on 
preventing physical security violations in public 
places by using two-factor authentication 
solutions while preserving privacy [8].   
Because of the importance of Machine to Machine 
(M2M) communication and the role it plays in 
industrial IoT, reference [9] proposed a lightweight 
authentication mechanism for M2M communication 
scenarios based on XOR and hash operations. The 
simplicity of the operations is obviously due to the 
weight considerations of the scheme. 
IoT security challenges may be divided into three 
categories [10]: Data Security, Privacy and Trust. In all 
of these categories, we have to take into our 
consideration that many IoT tools and equipment 
have low resources. Many of the issues originate from 
wireless links, where IoT systems depend on wireless 
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networks which bring along many security issues [3-
6][10,11]. 
In traditional solutions, we rely on trusted third 
parties like certificate authorities (CA) as trust 
anchors for key distribution and subsequently, 
authentication. However, CAs and Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) are built upon asymmetric 
cryptographic primitives. Asymmetric cryptographic 
solutions are known to be more complex and 
resource-demanding than symmetric ones thus are 
not popular choices for constrained devices.  
Moreover, the decentralized nature of  IoT, rules out 
the applicability of any central reference as it can turn 
into a bottleneck in the system [12]. The hierarchical 
structure of PKI is favorable though as it was designed 
with the scalability feature in mind.  
In the next section, we propose a hierarchical 
authentication framework that is intelligently 
designed to accommodate the limitations of IoT 
network.  
Lightweight Hierarchical IOT Authentication 
  Our solution employs symmetric lightweight 
computation techniques. It distributes the 
authentication computational load intelligently 
among the nodes across different levels. It has a 
hierarchical structure and IoT nodes form the leaves 
of this tree in a security overlay that is made on top of 
the traditional communication infrastructure. The 
core idea behind this solution is that parents act as 
security mediators. They practically implement 
mediated authentication protocols that are 
intelligently designed to run on resource-constrained 
devices. 
In this hierarchal architecture, at every level (except 
the root level), we have one or more head nodes, 
which work as mediators and have important roles in 
building authentication paths between the nodes 
engaged in an authentication or key establishment 
process.  
The proposed hierarchal security architecture has 
been shown in Fig. 1.  This figure shows a four-level 
architecture though in a broader perspective, it can be 
extended to have more levels. In the demonstrated 
figure, District Mediator (DM) is at the topmost level 
and acts as the root or master head. This could be a 
district’s security anchor. At a lower level, we have a 
Heads (H) e.g. in every home in the district which 
govern and cover the security needs of the IoT devices 
inside houses. Going further down, one gets to the 
Cluster Head (CH) level. Cluster heads mediate 
authentication and key establishment requests 
between two IoT devices in e.g. room. At lowest level 
lie the IoT nodes (N). As one can imagine, this 
structure can have more levels and go as far as City 
Mediator, Country Mediator, Continent Mediator, etc.  
In the next subsection, as an example of this 
architecture application, we show the authentication 
steps for an in-home key establishment scenario, that 
is, when the source and destination nodes both lie 
within the scope of a house head. Then, we generalize 
the case and take it to the district level in which an IoT 
object in one house decides to establish a connection 
with another object in a different house in the same 
district.  
 
In-home Authentication  
For in-home scenarios, we argue that a three-level 
architecture is sufficient, i.e. House Network Head (H), 
Cluster Head (CH) and IoT Node (N), as shown in 
Fig. 2.  Network Head has sufficient computational 
power and resources to mediate every in-house 
connection from the security perspective. It can be the 
home router for instance that connects the home 
network to the Internet. Notice that the traffic 
exchanged between the two IoT nodes does not 
(necessarily) travel though the H or even CH. As 
mentioned before, the proposed multi-level solution is 
a hierarchical overlay security architecture that shows 
the secure or trusted paths for e.g. authentication and 
session key establishment. However, the traffic is 
actually exchanged by the communication plane, 
 
Fig. 1.  The proposed hierarchical security overlay architecture 
for IoT key management and authentication. 
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which can be even direct from one node to another in 
some circumstances.  
Home network is partitioned into different clusters 
according to its architecture. Every device that has 
moderate resources, such as a smart Android TV, can 
be designated as a cluster head. It is important to 
know that the concept of cluster does not imply being 
static. For example, in Fig. 2, car itself is a cluster head 
and all the driver’s smart belongings can use the car 
CH to establish secure connections to the other IoT 
nodes in his/her home. In that case, the authentication 
and secure key establishment is mediated by the car 
CH but once the key is established, the traffic can be 
routed by the communication plane normally e.g. via 
4G/5G or VANET (Vehicular Ad hoc Network).  
At the third layer of Fig. 2, there are IoT nodes with 
the least resources which cannot perform complex 
computational tasks. In addition to these three layers, 
we can also have a Trusted Authority (TA) who sets 
the network up with initial parameters in a setup 
phase. It can be the nodes’ manufacturer in real-world 
scenarios. In setup phase, TA creates network 
parameters and publishes it among all network nodes 
in all layers.   
In the installation phase, H establishes secret values 
with all cluster heads and nodes. CHs and Ns have to 
register with H over secure channels. In practice, this 
is done manually. Every CH is registered with H and 
receives a secret value to communicate with the 
associated IoT nodes under it in the future. The same 
process is done for regular IoT nodes. For example, 
when the house owner buys a new smart IoT device, 
he/she will manually registers it with the house 
network head (e.q. by scanning a QR code Head 
generates) and specifies under which cluster head(s) 
it will operate. This binding or association of IoT nodes 
to certain CHs (and CHs to H) by using secret keys is a 
cryptographic trick introduced in some recent papers 
[13]. Fig. 3 shows the device installation phase 
visually, where every CH is registered with H by its ID. 
This intelligent approach avoids the need for public 
key/asymmetric cryptography at the edge level. 
Therefore, low-cost symmetric algorithms can be 
employed especially for the IoT nodes.  
After the installation phase, no (registered) node 
shall be allowed to get connected to H for getting 
private parameters in order to prevent impersonation 
attacks in the future. If a node is to be removed from 
the system, its registration key with the head can be 
deleted. This way, the node cannot establish a secure 
connection anymore.  
In the key agreement phase, each IoT node (N) uses 
the master secret it has been given to establish 
(symmetric) session keys with the associated CH.  
These carefully-chosen secret values help both parties 
authenticate each other during the key establishment 
phase too.  
For N-to-N authentication and (session) key 
agreement, we use mediators.  We can build an 
authenticated route between nodes in same cluster or 
in different clusters to help the two nodes 
authenticate each other. We have three type of 
authentication: between CHs via H as shown in Fig. 4, 
between Ns in same cluster via CH and between Ns in 
different clusters via CHs.  Note that since in all the 
scenarios that an IoT node is involved, it deals with a 
CH which is more capable in terms of resources,  
As we can see in Fig. 4, CH1 and CH2 build an 
authentic path between themselves with challenge 
 
 
Fig. 2. The key establishment and authentication security 
overlay architecture for in-house communications. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Device installation or registration phase.  
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and response mechanism and also establish a session 
key to have a direct secure channel for future 
communications. Note that the last message is not 
(necessarily) sent via H as the key has been 
established and the two entities can communicate 
over the communication plane directly.  
What we described was a CH-to-CH authentication 
and key agreement process. N-to-N authentication 
and key agreement is very similar with the difference 
that CHs will mediate the process in that case. If the 
two nodes reside in different clusters, the 
authentication shall be mediated by H as the first 
trusted entity both have access to is the head.   
As we noticed, creating authentication path 
between two sides crossing one mediator, helps in 
realization of the mutual authentication concept. We 
suggest using different key parts (seeds) to create 
session keys each time so that forward secrecy 
property is maintained.  
As was described in the previous scenarios, no IoT 
node directly engages with another IoT node for 
authentication or cryptographic purposes. This way 
the burden of authentication or heavy cryptographic 
computations can be intelligently pushed towards the 
more capable device handing the nodes security needs 
(i.e. CHs in this case) [13]. Once the authentication is 
done and the mutual session key is established 
between the two nodes, they can use a lightweight 
symmetric encryption and message authentication 
algorithm to directly communicate with each other. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Visual layout of the District Mediator (DM) in the 
hierarchical key management and authentication scheme. 
 
Fig. 4. CH to CH authentication and key agreement mediated by the Head. We have created two secure channels between 
CH1and H, and also, between CH2 and H, where all messages are encrypted by a the shared session keys 𝑆𝐾𝐶𝐻1,𝐻 and 
𝑆𝐾𝐶𝐻2,𝐻 , which was built during the registration/installation phase. The last message is sent directly from CH1 to CH2 
via the communication plane encrypted with  𝑆𝐾𝐶𝐻1,𝐶𝐻2 since no more security mediation is required.  
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Generalization to Multi-level Authentication 
The scenario we discussed in the previous 
subsection was an in-home one. Now, we show how 
this idea can be scaled up to support bigger IoT 
networks.  Assume that we want to add one more layer 
to the hierarchy to make district-wide IoT networks in 
which every node in that district can establish secure 
connection to any other node. More levels like city, 
country or continent can be similarly built up.  
For the district level, we need to need another object 
to the previous model, which acts as the mediator for 
in-home’s heads. We call this new player District 
Master (DM) as shown in Fig. 5. In the installation 
phase, we have to add/register Hs to DM and give each 
H an association key.  
Now, if one node from one house wants to connect 
to another node in a different house, for the sake of 
authentication and key establishment, it shall go 
through its CH, H and DM to get to the other side’s H, 
CH and finally N. Fig. 6 shows the authentication and 
key establishment process between two such nodes 
associated with two different houses. Where, the 
Heads have made a symmetric key by the help of 
District Master before. In addition, all mediators pass 
the key establishment requests/response to the next 
mediator, and have to decrypt and re-encrypt 
messages and ensure mutual authentication in every 
link. 
Note that like before, the built path is only used for 
authentication and key establishment. The traffic 
exchanged between these nodes can flow through the 
communication plane normally. Moreover, this idea 
does not lock any IoT object down to the house 
perimeter. Consider a house owner is driving and its 
smart phone wants to fetch some information from a 
neighbor’s sensor. If such a permission has been 
granted, its phone negotiates with the car CH and then 
with H and DM to get to the destination sensor’s H and 
CH.  After the destination node is authenticated and a 
key is established via the mediators, they can talk 
directly via the communication plane, even if the 
driver is on the move.  
Conclusion 
The important role of IoT in our lives and the its 
spread across many segments has raised concerns in 
areas that may contain sensitive prescriptive systems 
 
Fig. 6. Building an authentication and key establishment path between two nodes in different houses. The process 
is mediated by Cluster Heads and Home Heads. We have five secure channels between the nodes and mediators 
along the path. The last message is sent directly via the communication plane and encrypted with  𝑆𝐾𝑁1,𝑁2 as from 
this point on, no help in security mediation is required. 
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e.g. health and finance. Security of such 
interconnected systems has now become very crucial 
but to make any prescription for such a network, one 
has to take into consideration the limited processing 
power of IoT equipment and gadgets. In this paper, we 
proposed a lightweight authentication and key 
management framework with hierarchical structure 
that intelligently pushes the load of security services 
such as authentication towards mediators who are 
more capable or have more resources. One can take 
this framework and develop a protocol to realize a 
practical instance of it.  
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